All posts by Daniel Lacalle

About Daniel Lacalle

Daniel Lacalle (Madrid, 1967). PhD Economist and Fund Manager. Author of bestsellers "Life In The Financial Markets" and "The Energy World Is Flat" as well as "Escape From the Central Bank Trap". Daniel Lacalle (Madrid, 1967). PhD Economist and Fund Manager. Frequent collaborator with CNBC, Bloomberg, CNN, Hedgeye, Epoch Times, Mises Institute, BBN Times, Wall Street Journal, El Español, A3 Media and 13TV. Holds the CIIA (Certified International Investment Analyst) and masters in Economic Investigation and IESE.

Op-ed (CNBC): France exiting the euro would be the largest sovereign default in history with serious contagion effects

A few days ago, David Rachline of the far-right National Front party in France said that “the debt of France is about 2 trillion euros ($2.1 trillion), about 1.7 (trillion euros) are issued under French law, which means that it can be re-denominated.”

The economic program of the National Front specifically calls for the exit of the euro and the creation of a new currency, the French franc, which would be “closely” linked to the euro while allowing the government to undertake “competitive devaluations” making the transition in an “orderly way”.

There is only one problem. It does not work. There is no “orderly exit” from the euro. It is an oxymoron.

This would be the largest credit event in history and would create a massive contagion effect throughout the euro zone. The euro, obviously, would suffer from the break-up risk, so the fallacy of the “closely linked” second currency is simply a joke. Both would collapse in tandem.

The risk is already evident. The French-German yield spread has reached the highest level since 2012 despite the European Central Bank’s (ECB) massive quantitative easing. The ECB has bought more than 255 billion euros of French bonds.

This mirage of an “orderly exit” ignores that the French financial system, which carries assets more than three times the size of France´s GDP (gross domestic product), would be severely damaged from the impact of the credit event.

A financial system that already suffers from weak net income margins and more than 160 billion euros in non-performing loans, would collapse as these bad loans escalate and the losses in the banks’ bond portfolios eat away their core capital. This would inevitably lead to Greek-style capital controls and bank runs as the entities would lose liquidity support from the ECB.

This French exit from the euro would also mean the collapse of France’s pension and social security systems, which are mostly invested in sovereign bonds, the destruction of the savings of millions of citizens, and the bankruptcy of thousands of French small companies.

Let us remember that more than 40 percent of France’s government debt is held by the French savers, pensions and institutions, who would suffer the bulk of the losses from the default. No, there is not an “orderly exit”.

Banks’ outstanding home sovereign and sub-sovereign securities represented 6.4 percent of total assets in the EU, according to Standard & Poor’s. A credit event of this magnitude, and the subsequent contagion risk throughout the euro zone, would lead French and European banks and SMEs (small- to medium-sized businesses) to collapse.

The thought that sinking the currency and defaulting is going to improve the French economy is based on three myths:

That a default will not affect new credit and access to future financing. To think that a default would help France borrow more and cheaper is simply ridiculous.
That citizens would not be affected. Not only would savings and pensions be destroyed, access to credit from SMEs and families disappears, even if they want to invent a thousand public banks printing paper.
That the new economy would be stronger. Covering the large imbalances of the French economy with devaluations and a default harms the productive economy, leaving a weaker and less dynamic economy that leaves a global reserve currency to become a regional one. Import costs soar, and its main trade partners would suffer from the domino effect.
It is terrifying to see that citizens are led to believe in these fake magic solutions. No amount of money printing from the ECB would mitigate the impact of an effective default in France. Someone should tell Marine Le Pen that her plan has already been carried out. By Argentina, and its currency lost 13 zeros in 40 years.

— Daniel Lacalle is the chief investment officer at Tressis Gestión.

 

Who Buys Negative Yield Bonds?

The amount of bonds with negative yield in the Eurozone and Nordic countries is higher than $4.5 trillion. The global figure is closer to $9.5 trillion. It is estimated that by the end of 2017, 18% of the Global Government Bond Index will have negative rates.

This means paying to lend to governments.

But, who buys these bonds and why?

Let’s first look at the environment.

“Financial repression” is the term used to identify a period of extremely low interest rates and artificial depreciation of the currency. It is the assault on the saver that involves diluting the value of money and its price with the questionable objective of forcing – hence the word repression – citizens to stop saving, and resume consumption and investment.

The peak of financial repression is real negative rates. Advocates of this practice justify it from the fallacious argument that saving is bad and that what you have to do is force economic agents to spend. If money is worth nothing, consumers will prefer to consume and companies will use their surpluses to invest even if profitability is poor.

However, it does not happen. Because many of these countries have exceeded the debt saturation threshold, with more than 225% of GDP of total public and private debt. Thus, financial repression achieves the opposite of what it intends. More repression, more saving, because economic agents perceive that overcapacity and debt remain as burdens and that the price and quantity of money is artificially manipulated.

Contrary to what the New Keynesians belief, extreme financial repression leads to even more cautious actions by economic agents in the real economy
A period of financial repression such as the present one, leads families and companies to save much more. Preferences remain focused on being conservative in the face of increasing uncertainty.

Why do citizens become more risk averse amidst expansive policies? Why do companies not invest more in the face of low interest rates and extreme liquidity?

Because they do not trust the economic environment and the reality they see differs from the sugar coated central bank-created image. Because the certainty of tax increases and the fragility of economies is not disguised by manipulating the amount and cost of money. Governments that increasingly consume more resources from the real economy make household consumption and private investment a high risk.

So who buys bonds with negative returns?

Someone who thinks that the stock market and risky assets are going to collapse due to the liquidity saturation of expansionary policies and their low impact in the real economy. Therefore, faced with the possibility of losing 1% in a bond compared to losing, say 20-30% in the stock market or commodities, their preference is obvious.

– Those who assume that countries that do not participate in currency wars will see a strong currency relative to the one in which they invest. Say you buy Nordic bonds with negative yields and the local currency strengthens relative to the USD. The bond will be worth more from the currency move.

-Those who think that governments and central banks know how to get into quantitative easing, but have no idea how to get out. For this reason they expect to see further reductions in interest rates and more monetary expansion plans, which will revalue the low risk bonds further.

– Those who analyse these expansionary policies and currency wars and, instead of seeing inflation risk, estimate a greater deflationary probability, as the preferences for consumption and investment will not improve, they may worsen due to the lack of trust in central banks.

In short, contrary to what New-Keynesians believe, extreme financial repression leads to even greater caution -saving and divesting- . Meanwhile, the fragility of economies may increase if disposable income continues to be taxed away.

Financial repression only achieves the opposite of what it seeks to achieve.  All it creates are short-term bubbles in risky assets.

Now, inflation is rising, causing a massive loss in nominal and real terms for those who invested in low yield bonds. This will impact pension funds, and at the same time central banks remain behind the curve unable to raise rates and moderate money supply. The recipe for stagflation.

Daniel Lacalle. PhD in Economics and author of “Life in the Financial Markets”, “The Energy World Is Flat” (Wiley) and forthcoming “Escape from the Central Bank Trap”.

Image courtesy Google Images

Video: Brexit uncertainty means that BOE will not take action (20-2-2017)

 

Despite rising inflation and worrying trends in household consumption and housing markets, BoE is unlikely to make changes to monetary policy due to Brexit uncertainty.

Daniel Lacalle. PhD in Economics and author of “Life In The Financial Markets”, “The Energy World Is Flat” (Wiley) and forthcoming “Escape from the Central Bank Trap”.