Diesel’s Record Price Is Not Just the Iran War: It Is the Cost of Interventionist Energy Policy
How taxes, regulation, refinery closures, sanctions and declining domestic production turned a geopolitical shock into a diesel-price crisis
Do not blame diesel prices on the Iran war or the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz. The geopolitical risk premium attached to oil prices is relevant, but the market was already weakened by policy choices.
Europe has taxed motor fuels heavily, imposed escalating regulatory and carbon costs across the supply chain, closed refining capacity, sanctioned major sources of refined-product supply, and discouraged investment in domestic oil and gas production. Today’s refined product system is smaller, less flexible and more import-dependent, and, as such, every geopolitical disruption produces a larger price shock.
Diesel prices rise faster than crude because diesel suffers its own supply constraints, and these are politically imposed, not due to a war.
In the United States, retail diesel reached an all-time high of $5.85 per gallon on 4 September 2026. At the same time, the U.S. Gulf Coast diesel crack spread, the benchmark measure of diesel relative to crude, surged to multi-year highs. Therefore, the problem was more the availability of middle distillates rather than crude alone. U.S. refineries were operating at about 98% utilisation, leaving little spare capacity to offset another outage.
Globally, the impact is significant. Current supply losses include refinery disruption in the Middle East linked to the Iran war and reduced Russian diesel availability following Ukrainian attacks on refining infrastructure and export restrictions. All these elements add to the geopolitical risk premium, but they are magnified by the absence of spare refining capacity and the limits to regional supply.
Middle Eastern refinery disruptions have risen to almost 3.0 million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia’s Jizan refinery, with a capacity of 400,000 barrels per day, was one of the facilities where exports slumped. Additionally, Russian exports have plummeted. Russia was one of the world’s largest diesel exporters, but its seaborne diesel exports in June 2026 fell to 426,000 barrels per day from 827,000 barrels per day a year earlier. Refinery damage, domestic-supply priorities and export restrictions all affected the stability of an already fragile market.
However, these disruptions explain the timing of the latest surge, but they do not explain why importing economies entered the shock with so little capacity to absorb it. That is where interventionist policies have created the biggest damage.
European motorists do not pay diesel prices driven by crude, refining and logistics costs. The biggest driver is a tax-and-regulation-heavy final price. Direct taxes alone represented an average of 52.1% of the final price of Euro-super 95 petrol in the European Union, with several countries above 55%. Consumers pay more in fuel taxation than for the crude oil, refining and logistical components combined.
Diesel taxation varies by country, but the same structural tax burden remains. When we add excise duties and VAT, governments have created a large, rigid fiscal floor to fuel prices. When crude rises, the tax-inclusive base increases the final bill. However, when crude falls, large fixed tax components mean that the price paid by households and businesses does not fall proportionately.
The real policy burden is wider than the excise duty displayed at the service station. Costs are accumulated throughout the chain. From royalties and taxes on production; environmental compliance; energy costs and carbon charges at refineries; corporate and local taxes; regulated fees for storage and infrastructure; labour levies; financing costs created by regulatory uncertainty; and compliance costs for distribution and retail, the energy chain is a massive cash machine for governments. Many of these costs are not always shown as “fuel tax,” but they are passed through to the final price. Furthermore, the effect is cumulative.
Europe has not merely taxed fuels at the point of sale, it has piled fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs from exploration and importation through refining, storage, transport and retail distribution. That makes the retail price structurally less responsive to lower crude prices and more vulnerable to supply shocks.
The second structural problem is the loss of refining capacity.
The United States did not lose refining flexibility because of one executive order or one EPA rule. It was a cumulative policy tsunami. Obama’s air-quality regulations and renewable-fuel mandates added compliance and capital costs, while Biden retained and expanded renewable-fuel obligations, restricted small-refinery relief and reinforced a policy environment in which long-lived petroleum investments faced greater regulatory risk and higher costs. The clearest consequence has appeared in California, where stringent state regulation, expensive compliance and mandated energy-transition policies have coincided with the closure of major refineries. The result is not lower dependence on fuels in the short term, but less domestic capacity to produce them, and greater vulnerability when global diesel supply is disrupted. Fortunately, the United States is not suffering an enormous diesel shortage problem as Europe’s, because total U.S. crude-oil refining capacity did not fall between 2008 and 2026, standing at 18.16 million barrels per day.
In Europe, on comparable tax-inclusive retail prices, the EU average is about $8.90 per U.S. gallon, versus $5.97 per gallon in the United States, or 49% higher. Several European markets were close to $10.70–$10.90 per gallon as of September 11th, 2026.
Between 2020 and 2024, European refining capacity fell from about 15.3 million barrels per day to 14.7 million barrels per day, a reduction of nearly 600,000 barrels per day. Europe has lost more than 20% of its refining capacity since 2009. Refineries have been shut, converted to import terminals or biorefineries, reducing conventional crude-processing capacity just when global diesel supply has become more problematic.
A refinery may appear unnecessary during periods of large imports and open trade routes. However, it becomes strategic when imported diesel is disrupted. Closing a refinery does not eliminate domestic demand for diesel. It converts domestic production capacity into an additional need for imported product and foreign refining capacity.
The EU’s decision to restrict Russian petroleum products did not eliminate Europe’s demand for transport, agricultural and industrial fuel. Now diesel must be delivered from more distant suppliers, with longer routes, high freight costs and more exposure to congestion in the Red Sea or the Strait of Hormuz. Sanctions may have created an indirect boomerang effect, making Europe more dependent. In January 2026, the EU also banned imports of petroleum products refined from Russian crude in third countries, closing the so-called refining loophole. That restricted available supply even more.
Sanctions are justified as a geopolitical tool. But they became very expensive, especially when the EU’s policy framework disincentivizes refining investment at home. Restricting a key supplier while shrinking local refining capacity is a dangerous combination, and governments cannot expect consumers and businesses to be shielded from a global refined-products shock. Thus, the EU has created a suicidal combination instead of a security of supply strategy.
Another important aspect is the limits to North Sea production. The North Sea is a mature basin, and its production decline is a reality. UK North Sea oil and gas production fell by 72% between 1999 and 2025. However, natural decline does not make policy irrelevant. High windfall taxation, uncertainty over fiscal terms, restrictions on new licensing and the broader political message that hydrocarbon investment is not desirable reduce incentives to maintain infrastructure, pursue incremental projects, explore and develop viable resources. Such policies may not change next month’s global diesel price by themselves, but they have an important impact on supply, investment and infrastructure available.
UK government policy confirmed a ban on new licences for new North Sea oil and gas fields, while allowing some exceptions linked to existing fields and infrastructure. The strategic impact is still clear. A country facing declining production and shrinking refining capacity becomes more dependent on imported oil and refined products at the time when global trade routes are closing.
Domestic crude is not the same as domestic diesel. However, domestic output is essential, as it reduces import needs, supports regional infrastructure and refining optionality, improves the balance of supply during disruption and limits exposure to external suppliers. Thus, abandoning this capacity without a truly scalable substitute is a policy decision with massive security-of-supply consequences.
Europe’s policy framework adds more restrictions. Refining is capital-intensive, energy-intensive and emissions-intensive. Carbon taxes, environmental mandates, compliance obligations, high electricity and gas costs, and regulatory risk make investment unviable and closures more likely.
Can it get worse? The next step of the EU framework could add another direct challenge. The ETS2 emissions-trading system is scheduled to apply to fuels used in buildings and road transport from 2027, subject to its implementation rules and safeguards. It is designed to place a carbon price on suppliers of those fuels. This makes a market already burdened by high excise duties, VAT and supply constraints will face another structural cost layer.
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism does not directly tax diesel at the forecourt, but it will raise costs for carbon-intensive inputs such as steel, cement, aluminium, fertilisers, hydrogen and imported electricity. Those costs are essential for refinery maintenance, tanks, pipelines, and transport infrastructure. All these political decisions raise the cost of keeping Europe’s energy system functioning.
Diesel is not a discretionary consumer good. It is the engine of the real economy. Without affordable diesel, freight transport, farming equipment, construction machinery, industrial logistics, emergency services, parts of mining and maritime activity, and parts of distribution are going to add more inflationary pressures.
The diesel shock does not end at the service station. Higher diesel costs will raise the cost of moving food from farms to warehouses and supermarkets; carrying inputs to factories; delivering medicines and manufactured goods; and operating machinery at construction sites. Businesses already suffering weak margins will pass those costs into final prices. Policy-created diesel inflation creates an economically disastrous second-round effect. This will hit transport, food, goods and services even after the war ends.
A logical energy policy should be focused on affordability, availability, and security of supply. Dismantling the physical capacity that keeps the economy supplied during an energy transition just demolishes the economy and achieves the opposite of what politicians want. The West becomes more dependent and poorer.
- Europe cannot tax, regulate and limit the energy system across every stage of the value chain, close the industrial assets needed to process fuels, limit investment in production and then act surprised when diesel becomes scarce and expensive. Developed economies should preserve and modernize strategic refining capacity rather than treating it as a disposable legacy asset, eliminate the cumulative tax, carbon and regulatory burdens that destroy energy competitiveness, and support domestic energy production.