Why Can’t Trump Apply the “Chainsaw” Like Milei? A Detailed Analysis

In recent months, many libertarians have criticised Donald Trump’s economic policies, arguing that he is not implementing drastic public spending cuts like Javier Milei has done in Argentina.

However, this comparison ignores key structural and contextual differences between the two countries and their governments. Below is a detailed explanation of why the situation in the United States under Trump is different from that of Argentina under Milei and why criticisms of Trump’s strategy are unfounded.

Three things have happened in the past three months that are best understood together.

The International Atomic Energy Agency issued a historic resolution against Iran for violating its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.

Additionally, OPEC+ agreed to increase production threefold despite weak global oil demand growth, reaching the equivalent of the entirety of Iran’s exports in immediately available excess capacity, looking to offset any disruption in global oil markets from any conflict with Iran. 

Furthermore, several Sunni neighbouring nations have reached historic agreements with the United States and allow Israeli and American aircraft to fly over their airspace and use their bases.

OPEC+’s decision to offset the risk of disruption in Iran’s exports has two clear objectives: strengthen Saudi Arabia’s position as the global central bank of oil and limit any damage to China’s oil supply. China buys 90% of Iran’s oil exports.

Allow me to remind you of a few uncomfortable truths.

Government spending is out of control in developed nations. Furthermore, no interventionist government wants to cut spending or balance the budget. Government spending empowers politicians, and reducing it means losing the grip on the economy.

Interventionist governments aren’t concerned about debts, deficits, or inflation. Inflation is a deliberate policy, and interventionist governments seek to nationalize the economy while imposing total control over productive sectors by issuing continuously devalued currencies.

The EU-US trade deal should have been the easiest to complete.

However, the deal is not progressing because the negotiation team refuses to lift any of the EU’s non-tariff barriers or to discuss the limitations imposed on US agricultural, livestock, and car exports.

These are the reasons why it should have been a concise and quick trade deal:

. Most of the United States’ team demands coincide with the Draghi report’s concerns about excessive regulation and internal barriers. According to Eurochambres estimates, the cost of hyper-regulation for the EU exceeds one trillion euros per year. Draghi himself warned in an FT article, “Forget the US—Europe has successfully put tariffs on itself,” citing IMF estimates that show that internal barriers, regulation, and taxation increase prices in the services sector by 110 per cent and in manufacturing by 45 per cent.