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Is the EU growing or getting fat?

The economic sentiment index in the Eurozone is at a five-year high. The index (ESI) rose to 109.6 and has been growing for steadily. With estimates of consumption growth moving between 1.5 and 1.7%, and investment growth of 2.5%, data confirms that manufacturing indices also continue to expand.

To positive macro data, we can add corporate results. In the Eurostoxx 600 we have seen results from 186 companies with a decent sales increase, with a strong double-digit net income improvement. This growth also occurs at the same time as balance sheets have been strengthening.

Is it a direct consequence of the European Central Bank’s policy? Not necessarily. The ECB policy has negatively affected the financial sector earnings and corporate margins remain poor in EU companies’ domestic businesses while deleveraging was much more intense between 2011 and 2013.

There is no denying that Mario Draghi ‘s “stick and carrot” messages have been essential to preventing a new housing bubble fueled by cheap credit, but it is still relevant that almost 30% of the credit granted to the private sector goes to real estate, services and administration. The level of growth is not worrisome, but the increase of investment and credit growth is going to very low productivity sectors.

Investment growth is very poor because low rates and excess liquidity have been essential factors in perpetuating endemic overcapacity (25%) and zombifying sectors of low productivity. But, additionally, almost half of the gross capital formation in the EU’s large economies comes from construction, as Claus Vistesen warns.

Credit growth of 2.4% in March shows that the increase in money supply is still much higher than the growth in leading indicators, and whether this improvement is generated in sectors whose profitability and survival depend on ultra-low rates, can generate an important risk. That is why it is worth analyzing a ratio that analysts tend to be forgotten in Europe,  inventory to sales. It has risen steadily in the past months.

The recent accumulation is not worrying in the Eurozone, but we cannot ignore the risk of extreme credit conditions pushing to perpetuate a model of poor added value. When more than 50% of the total credit granted – public and private – goes to current expenditure and areas of low productivity, the brief “placebo” effect of expansive policies may create a boomerang effect afterward.

According to Moody’s the risk is huge when a very significant part of the companies and governments in the EU could not absorb a 1% interest rate increase.

That is why Draghi’s message on the importance of structural reforms is so relevant, reminding that monetary policy is not a free ride to increase imbalances. Unfortunately, the perpetuation of those imbalances and the perverse incentive to increase the weight of low-productivity sectors is enormous. It is quite evident. Who are the sectors and companies whose investment decisions depend on low rates? Those with poor added value, low margin and weak productivity. With all the effort being made by the ECB to avoid perverse incentives, it is impossible to limit them because the greatest perverse incentive is the so-called expansive policy itself.

When that poor growth and productivity effect given by monetary policy ceases to have its placebo effect, it will be said that “it was not enough” and that it is necessary to repeat.

There are positive elements. Eurozone banks paid € 3.6 billion to the European Central Bank for excess liquidity in 2016 which, at the end of this article, remains at 1.27 trillion euros. That shows that they are not giving loans like crazy, and prefer to be penalized than to repeat the mistakes of 2007.

The reader may say that sectors with good margins and high productivity do not need credit, or at least in large amounts. But think of the reasoning. If it is so, then credit growth as a driver of improvement in the economy is a mistake, because it increases leverage to sectors that cannot face a change of cycle with strength.

In reality, the problem of the Eurozone has never been of liquidity – there was already an excess of it in 2013 – or access to credit, but of excess debt, low value added and overcapacity. The solution should not have come from a monetary policy that encourages indebtedness, no matter how much Draghi warns, but to eliminate that excess of unproductive spending and favor the change of growth pattern to technology and value-added sectors.

By maintaining the imbalances of the decade of excess we are missing the opportunity to prepare for the future.

We are far from a bubble situation, but in Europe, we are perpetuating overcapacity and the weight of rent-seeking and low productivity sectors, those that governments call “strategic”, and increasing debt to sustain current expenditure. And all of this does not make the EU stronger, it makes it fatter.

Daniel Lacalle is a PhD in Economics, fund manager and author of Escape from the Central Bank Trap (BEP), Life In The Financial Markets, and The Energy World Is Flat (Wiley).

Image courtesy @Focuseconomics

How CEOs can avoid the central bank trap (CEO World)

This article was published in CEO World

We live in strange times. In the past eight years the US has created more money than in the previous fifty years combined, and at the same time interest rates have never been so low. However, total real gross investment in the OECD as a whole only returned to the pre-crisis level by 2014 and remains sluggish at best. In the same period, companies have been increasing cash flow generation and dividends and buy-backs have soared.

Why is this happening?

Welcome to financial repression. Extreme liquidity and zero interest rates policies have come with a nasty addition. Tax burden. Not only price and value of money has been artificially distorted, but the tax burden in the OECD is at all-time highs.

Financial repression is achieving the opposite of what it intends to create. The mainstream economists will tell you that lowering interest rates and massively increasing liquidity will push economic agents to take more risk, consume more and invest long term. But it does not happen as expected. Companies are more prudent in their investment criteria, and families actually save more, increasing their deposits. Economic agents perceive there is something odd in the economy, even if they are not experts, and become more prudent in the face of what is clearly a distorted cost and value of money. The central bank trap, which I discuss in my latest book.

The fact is that financial repression in the past eight years has resulted in one of the largest transfers of wealth from families and businesses into government since the Bretton Woods agreement, $1.5 trillion in new taxes in the US added to $9 trillion of new debt and $4.7 trillion of monetary stimulus. This, in turn, has driven a weak recovery.

A CEO today should be excited.

The opportunities that the central bank trap has generated are enormous.

First, expensive acquisitions made by others lured by the liquidity trap will become the exciting value opportunities for the prudent CEO that has avoided falling into the mirage of cheap debt. In the past two years, takeover targets have sold for a median of 11 times Ebitda, according to Bloomberg, whereas the multiple was only about 7-9 times up until then. Transactions are getting ever-bigger and more expensive, pushing total goodwill to $6.9 trillion. I believe that the sobering factor of tighter monetary policies, added to the reality of challenges in the economy, will generate extremely attractive acquisition opportunities when the bubble bursts. Of course, some CEOs have been very prudent making bolt-on acquisitions while preserving cash and strengthening the balance sheet, and some multiples are justified by realistic growth estimates, but many of the acquisitions that rose in multiples only due to cheap money and low rates will be the write-downs for some, and subsequent opportunities for the prudent manager.

Second, prudent CEOs have been right focusing on total shareholder return via dividends and buybacks in a period of weak growth and increased uncertainty. This has led to a historic high level of cash preservation and a clear mentality of focusing on return on invested capital. For a CEO, correct capital allocation is the main concern, and what better capital allocation than dividends and its own shares if there are no evident growth opportunities elsewhere? This period has seen an unprecedented decline in interest rates, but any CEO knows that perpetuation of overcapacity and large imbalances have also meant that the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of most industries has not fallen. Instead, WACC has increased globally due to the poor growth and higher risk attached to the equity part of the equation. Therefore, the prudent CEO will not take this rise in WACC as an anomaly, or ignore it, but understand why equity risk premium rises –uncertainty on future estimates, constant downgrades from international agencies of their expectations-.  As such, a prudent CEO will analyze capital allocation opportunities with the view of preserving the value of his or her company, while placing investments in areas where conservative estimates allow a comfortable return on invested capital above its WACC. This strategy will help the CEO navigate an uncertain world where economic cycles have become shorter and more abrupt, as I explain in my book. There is no need to stop investing, rather the opposite, just analyze opportunities that enhance value while keeping a firm eye on shareholder return. We are seeing an improvement in growth and inflation estimates globally in 2017, but we need to pay attention as well to the imbalances that come with those expectations: Perpetuation of overcapacity, higher debt and higher taxes.

Third, CEOs should be excited about the opportunities that digitalization and robots offer. We are moving towards an age where there are lower capital requirements to deliver stronger earnings growth and efficiency and productivity will likely soar. Embracing change and leading the process is a critical element for CEOs to succeed. Another important recommendation to escape the central bank trap is to lead this change looking at higher innovation and investment in research and development. The biggest mistake a CEO can make in this environment is to follow the trap and increase spending disproportionately on subsidized areas or rent-seeking businesses. Low interest rates and high liquidity might lure many to poor productivity sectors, but these are the ones that will suffer the most when the tide turns, and it does. However, high value-added, superior productivity, technology differentiated companies with strong brands will not only gain market share and value, but thrive in complex economic cycles.

Most CEOs have behaved impeccably in this zero-interest-rate, massive liquidity environment. They have ignored the dangerous siren call to take excess risk and more debt and have focused on strengthening the value of their companies while reducing imbalances and creating an environment for a better, more sustainable growth model.ost companies did not follow their incentive to overspend and take more debt. But no government or central bank committee has more or better information about where and how to invest than CEOs and their teams. It is easy to “demand” more investment from companies when the person doing so has no skin in the game. Now, the evidence is clear. The majority of CEOs did the right thing.

Now it is time to look at the future forgetting artificial monetary mirages and demand-side policies. The successful and prudent CEO will adapt and lead change focusing on productivity, technology and added value. And will reap the benefits of absorbing those that believed in growth by government decree and the illusion of the monetary laughing gas mirage.

The future belongs to those CEOs that focus on real fundamental trends and ignore the central bank trap.


Daniel Lacalle is the author of “Escape from the Central Bank Trap” (2017, BEP) ,“Life In The Financial Markets” (Wiley, 2014) and “The Energy World Is Flat” (Wiley, 2014, with Diego Parrilla).

“I am very positive on the US as a nation” (Interview in Vendome Magazine)

Please read the complete interview here.

One of the top 20 most influential economists in the world, investment manager, best-selling writer… He makes complex economy issues look simple and debunks phony political leaders on live TV. Born in Spain, but living in London, Daniel Lacalle spreads uncomfortable truths about the international economy:

Are you positive regarding the USA’s economic future under Trump?

I’m very positive about the USA as nation.

I believe that we usually imbue the economy, especially the USA’s, with a presidential veil that doesn’t exist. America’s economy doesn’t depend, as it typically happens in European economies, on what president A or president B decides; it’s a very free economy and it’s much more attached to the interests of thousands and thousands of companies which don’t have any kind of relation with the State. I believe the Trump Administration is being demonized in a very aggressive way because the media and analysts, in general, don’t like the character himself, Donald Trump. I think we should discern between the character and reality. Just like it happened with Obama, but the other way around. With Obama, there was a “media lover affair” with the character. He was a very attractive, convincing and politically correct character, and due to that almost romantic relationship between the media, economic analysts and the government, there was a tendency to enrapture and sweeten his economic policies. The opposite is happening to Donald Trump. He hasn’t been there for a long time yet, but people tend to add a negative tone to everything he proposes from an economic point of view just because it’s him when, actually, many of his policies have been successfully applied in the past by previous presidents; that’s why I believe we need less Manicheism with the character, without failing to criticize him for the things we don’t like, but there’s no need to be so biased with American presidents.

It’s a very typical mistake of the media and of the consensus analysts in Europe to sweeten and deify the Democratic presidents and to demonize in an almost caricatured way the Republican presidents because, in Europe, right-wing and left-wing are usually closer to each other than the Democrat and Republican Party.

Very few news media outlets or analysts are in tune with the values of America’s Republican Party. I believe that polarization over the perception of presidents is a little bit fake, first of all. I remember when George W. Bush spoke at a reception where I was too and said that, after a month in the White House, receiving all the advisers who told him what to do, with whom he had to negotiate what and with whom he had to approve what, he told his wife “Let’s go on vacation because I can’t do anything”. In the USA’s economy things such as a regimental presidency where the president says “Do this” and everyone responding “Yes, sir” don’t exist; it’s an economy where advisors and State secretaries have their very own opinions and they defend them. It’s also a civil society with its institutions and what’s called “checks and balances”. Therefore, we should be less biased or actually, less “personalist” when it comes to analyzing American politics and economy from the point of view of a character.

Did you foresee the victory of Brexit?

No, and curiously I perceived a clear difference in the absolutely devastating messages coming from some news media outlets which didn’t even considered the possibility of a victory of Brexit. However, and these are things that are important to learn as an analyst, in the day-to-day and in the conversations with citizens, something different was perceived than what news media outlets and consensual economists tried to show as the only possibility, the NO. Something didn’t quite add up. The experience of that error when it comes to analyzing the risk of Brexit helped me a lot in the American elections shortly after.

I went to the USA and I thought “Wait, everyone is saying there’s an 81% chance that Hillary will win. 81%?!” – they didn’t even consider another option.

I remember an anecdote: I was watching on TV a show with Bill Maher and Ann Coulter. When asked who they thought was going to win the elections, she said Donald Trump. Both the audience and the other commentators in the table burst out laughing, which made me think “Hold on, something’s going on here; we might make the same mistake”. We must be much closer to citizens to understand not what the confirmation bias tries to perpetuate, which is: since we get together with people of the same class and the same media we all decide that the consensus must be this… and then we’re wrong.

 

The victory of Brexit really saddened me. It still does, because I understand the reasons why the UK wants to leave the EU, but it makes me sad because I think the UK was a force that exerted an important balance in the UE by keeping away the interventionist agenda of some countries.

Is there a short term positive future for the UK?

Yes. I believe I must be intellectually honest: just because I didn’t want the UK to vote for Brexit, doesn’t mean I won’t analyze where I was wrong and, especially, that I analyze in an objective way that we were wrong.

I remember that the affirmations of consensus analysts and experts was that simply due to the decision of the UK to vote Brexit the economy was going to plummet, hundreds of thousands of jobs were going to disappear and there was going to be a debacle. That hasn’t happened.

If we aren’t intellectually honest when it comes to analyzing, like it happened in the USA, where analysis was completely optimist and biased regarding the American economy as if it was all wonderful, and if we don’t analyze properly, instead of learning from the mistakes, what we do is justify ourselves with another premise like “Oh it came out this way because dumb people and rednecks voted it”.

Do you think Madrid has potential to become the new “City” after Brexit?

Well, if didn’t believe so I wouldn’t be supporting it (laughs). I think it has a lot of potential, but us, the citizens of Madrid and the institutions, must want it and show the merits. If I didn’t believe it, I wouldn’t support it.

The role that fills me professionally the most is all that hast to do with spreading and explaining my thesis, opinions and analysis. I think it’s very valuable and, in addition, you learn a lot from that process of divulging and listening to other people’s questions and criticisms. I find it very positive and rewarding.

Do you believe that political ideology influences the success of a country?

Absolutely. When you listen to an economist or an expert talking about economic policy or macroeconomic, monetary or fiscal policies saying that they’re only talking about economics and not about ideology, that’s the ultimate evidence that they’re lying to you.

There’s always an ideology and a personal stand that informs economic theories, analysis and recommendations.

Denying this is, first of all, lying; secondly, denying that you’re making an analysis and recommendations in what is an experience of systems, policies and, theories, you include a perception of what the benefit is for society. Economics is a social science, therefore saying that there isn’t an ideology behind its analysis is lying.

Have you ever considered working in politics as finance minister or have received any offer?

If I’m ever offered the honor of representing and supporting my country, I, like probably 90% of people, would consider it a real honor and would feel really proud. In any case, what I do is my professional activity. I believe it’s possible to influence and participate in society with your professional activity without being necessarily involved in politics. I have very good relations with political leaders and political figures and, furthermore,  and I believe it should be this way, many times we do a social function by sharing our opinions, our ideas and our recommendations with them.

Do you believe basic finance should be taught in schools?

Absolutely. It’s a deficiency of the education system that there isn’t basic finance and economy education. Not in economic policies and governments where political ideologies are included, but rather in finance management, the management of our savings, of our daily life, how to start a business… I think it’s absolutely essential.

Is it frustrating to you to find new political leaders who try to sell absurd economic policies and fool people due to that lack of economic education?

Rather than frustrating, it’s sad that it becomes politically profitable to present fake magic solutions.

I believe it’s important that society has basic knowledge so that when they’re sold fallacies such as “increasing taxes on rich people we can pay for all kinds of costs”, people can actually understand the mechanisms of the economy. I don’t think it’s a lost battle because all of us who are involved keep fighting, but when one analyses the last 600 years of the economy in the world, the tendency to turn complex economic problems into magic solutions that apparently nobody had thought about before and which are always wrong, is unfortunately politically profitable.

When you look back at the beginnings of your career do you think “what was I thinking”?

Of course! I remember when we were told that competitive devaluations were something great, and I remember because I suffered them when I started to work. While we were told from the academia or the Government that devaluations were positive for the economy, something didn’t quite add up. And what was it? How I was suffering in my own pocket and in my life the debacle that devaluation meant. I think this one is a very clear case of one’s evolution and how you realize things through empirical reality.

What made you choose a career as an economist? Did you always want to be one?

Yes. I love music and cinema. Particularly music, I’m a fanatic. Economy has always fascinated me. It fascinates me so much that one of the parts that I have always loved about music, for instance, has been the business side of it. The part related to how a recording studio works, the budgets of records, the tours, how you earn or lose money…

So did you ever considered working in the music business?

Yes, of course. When I was a youngster I thought I could be a rock star, but then I realized my lack of talent (laughs).

When you write your books do you target a particular section of the audience?

I target a general audience. What I strive to with my books is to make them accessible to the public, to make them interesting and to add rigorous analysis for the experts. What I don’t try is to dogmatize and step up to a podium to give lessons. I try to have a dialogue with the reader to bring that economic reality closer to everyone no matter their age or knowledge. To me, it’s very important to spread but not from the pulpit like “HA! Poor you, you can’t understand me”; if I can’t be understood, if what I’m trying to explain can’t be comprehended, that’s my mistake, not the reader’s.

 

My advice to economy students is: make mistakes. I would give them two recommendations: first of all, don’t think that filling up your CV with courses and masters will speed up or improve your options. Study, learn as much as you can, but work. Working gives you a tremendous perspective. One must make mistakes, and by this I don’t mean doing things the wrong way on purpose, but to take risks, take opportunities, go abroad… Don’t fall in that false comfort of a system that is very protective: family, etc. Take risks.

Daniel Lacalle is a PhD in Economics, fund manager and author of Escape from the Central Bank Trap (BEP), Life In The Financial Markets, and The Energy World Is Flat (Wiley).

Image courtesy Vendome Magazine

France Elections, A Risk to the Euro?

France is such a socialist country that, in the polls, the four candidates appear each with 20% vote intention. The voter has a “wide” variety of choice: the Socialist, the Social-Democrat, the Communist and the National Socialist.

However, what should amaze anyone is the fact that nearly 40% of the voters are choosing an anti-Euro option.

The rise of anti-Euro populism is not due to “austerity”. And populism is not defeated with more interventionism. France is the proof.

In France there has been no austerity, as the Natixis shows in “A big misunderstanding: The French think that there has been austerity”. Not only has public spending and the state intervention increased to 57% of GDP, with the government controlling major companies and nearly 70% of the economy, France has carried out for years a wrongly-called “expansive” Keynesian policy, despite two decades of stagnation. France is the example of a failure of central planning statism that some blame on the fact that there was not enough of it.

In the face of a misdiagnosis (“populism is due to the -ineexistent- budget cuts”), politicians propose the erroneous solution (“populism must be fought with more interventionism”), and what this does is legitimate the wrong message of magical solutions that lead the voter to prefer the most radical ideas.

Among those magical solutions, there are few things more ridiculous than the populist promise that everything will be great if France gets out of the euro and defaults.

In a delirious interview with Melenchon, the populist ultra-left candidate, he said that he counted on the “atomic bomb”. Stop paying the debt. A genius. “If we stop paying the debt, the economy does not suffer, only bankers suffer,” he said. On the other side of economic schizophrenia, at the far right, LePen’s party claimed that “70% of the French debt is issued before the monetary union, so it can be redenominated in French francs.” And they didn’t blink.

They forgot that their country runs a structural deficit and that it cannot finance that huge amount of expenses if it defaults.

They forgot that more than 40% of the French debt is in the pension plans, social security and savings of its citizens, which would sink their beloved welfare state.

They forgot that, in order to finance public expenditures of more than 1.2 trillion euros (57% of GDP), France needs a secondary market that supports the monetary policy of the Central Bank and a currency that is accepted globally as a reserve.

They forgot that, if France defaults on public debt, the risk premium of SMEs and families in their country soars and credit dries.

They forgot that their local financial system is three times the GDP of France and that, if a default sends it to bankruptcy, they can say farewell to citizens’ deposits.

Every populist always comes up with the brilliant idea of ​​doing what has never worked and thinking that this time will be different. Melenchon and LePen, like the rest, look at Venezuela or Zimbabwe and think that it has not worked because they were not in charge.

They forget that such a destruction is not solved by printing French francs, because it ignores the history and the disaster that inflationary policies were for Europe, always with the same result. Sink the economy, blame the external enemy, inflationism, war and back again.

The fallacy that a country will solve structural problems devaluing the currency is more than dismantled by reality. As if the ECB had not carried a massively expansive monetary policy, within the euro, they believe that the problem is that it is not devalued enough. France has spent ten years with an expansive fiscal and monetary policy, as shown by Natixis, and they think the problem is that it was not enough. That it did not work because the populists were notin power.

Default and devaluation destroy the average citizen, businesses and families, wiping out savings and deposits, cost of imports soar and the ability to finance their beloved State, collapses.

Lessons from the economic history of France:

Between 1790 and 1793, 3,500 million notes were issued in France, the so-called Assignats, which soon lost 95% of the value artificially decided by politicians. Of course, food prices soared with the loss of value of the currency. Finance Minister Claviere blamed the shopkeepers and the “merchants” and promised to force the machines and print more money.

Prices continued to rise inexorably. Money was worth less and less, and therefore, goods and services cost more and more.

And what did the French government do to make up for the mistake? Print more money, raise taxes and confiscate properties, destroying real investment and trade in the face of lack of legal certainty. The Jacobins introduced the “Law of Maximums” prohibiting price increases. Like Kirchner, Maduro … At the same time, they punished with jail and the guillotine anyone who rejected payment with paper money. This just got the shops closed, because owners just did not want those colored papers that were no longer worth anything.

Of course, now it is different. At that time, the state was not in debt more than 100% of its GDP, with more than 40% of that debt in the hands of families, with a structural deficit and a public expenditure of almost 60% of GDP.

But it is what populists want to repeat, with the argument that “this time is different”.

All populist inflationists always talk about the United States and the dollar to justify their monetary mirage and forget to be a global reserve currency, have a functioning secondary market and an attractive and dynamic market-based economy. The US dollar is not the global reserve currency because it is decided by a committee. It is so because the world trusts its economy.

I remember an episode of Game of Thrones in which a character said “he would not mind burning down the kingdom as long as he is appointed the king of the ashes”. That’s the populist strategy. To destroy the economy and proclaim themselves as the only savior, as the solution to their own sabotage. Poor France.

 

Daniel Lacalle is a PhD in Economics, fund manager and author of Escape from the Central Bank Trap (BEP), Life In The Financial Markets, and The Energy World Is Flat (Wiley).

Image courtesy Google Images, CNN