Why Can’t Trump Apply the “Chainsaw” Like Milei? A Detailed Analysis

In recent months, many libertarians have criticised Donald Trump’s economic policies, arguing that he is not implementing drastic public spending cuts like Javier Milei has done in Argentina. However, this comparison ignores key structural and contextual differences between the two countries and their governments. Below is a detailed explanation of why the situation in the United States under Trump is different from that of Argentina under Milei and why criticisms of Trump’s strategy are unfounded.

1. The Committed Budget: Biden’s Legacy

It is hard to understand why European libertarians fail to grasp such a basic concept as the “fiscal year”. The U.S. fiscal year begins on October 1, and the Biden administration took advantage of this to ramp up spending.

When Trump took office in January 2025, 97% of the federal budget for that year was already committed or spent. This was due to the Biden administration’s approval of several “Full Year Continuing Resolutions”, which left most funds and expenditures locked in for fiscal year 2025. Thus, Trump had no room to make immediate and drastic cuts, as most of the budget was untouchable until the next fiscal cycle.

Despite this, in 2025, discretionary spending reductions equivalent to $541 billion were carried out, and the accumulated deficit between April and May 2025 was 97% lower than in the same period of 2024.

2. Mandatory and Discretionary Spending

Mandatory spending (which includes programs like Social Security and Medicare) had already been increased by the Biden administration, and this increase took effect between February and December 2025. The U.S. fiscal year starts in October, and Biden implemented most of these increases through Continuing Resolutions (CRs) and the extension of existing programs, consolidating and, in many cases, increasing federal spending in key areas.

These resolutions included over $100 billion in funds for federal disaster assistance programmes, $29 billion for FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund, and $10 billion in economic assistance for agricultural producers.

At the end of 2024, Biden approved a $54 billion (8%) increase in major mandatory spending programmes such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, as well as the extension of Obamacare, all applicable to 2025.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) budget grew by $21 billion (700%), and the Trump administration was only able to act on $14 billion that was discretionary.

It is essential to remember that Biden did all this without a new budget law, simply by maintaining and extending existing allocations.

Biden’s proposed 2025 budget included additional increases, but these were blocked because they did not receive congressional approval.

Trump needs congressional approval to reverse these increases and reduce spending. That is what the “Big Beautiful Bill” includes. On the other hand, discretionary spending, especially in defence, was also committed, further limiting the new government’s immediate room for action.

The Big Beautiful Bill includes the first reduction in mandatory spending in the last sixty years—$1.6 trillion—and $2.4 trillion in discretionary spending.

3. Initial Fiscal Results

Despite these restrictions, the Trump administration achieved certain advances: in April, the second-largest fiscal surplus in history was recorded, and although a deficit reappeared in May, the deficit between March and May has been slashed compared to 2024. This indicates that measures were already being taken to improve the fiscal situation, mainly through higher revenues from trade agreements and private sector growth.

4. The “Big Beautiful Bill” and Deficit Reduction

It is astonishing that some libertarians and Austrians criticise the Big Beautiful Bill by buying into the Keynesian narrative that there will be no improvement in revenues, growth, employment, or investment from deregulation, trade agreements, and tax cuts.

That some libertarians deny the Laffer curve and the boost from deregulation surprises me. The Big Beautiful Bill incorporates $7 trillion in committed investments from trade negotiations, which also attract $4 trillion in tax revenues over the legislative period and a stimulus effect on the economy that results in an increase in tax revenues in the baseline scenario of $1.2 trillion.

Contrary to what some critics claim, the “Big Beautiful Bill” will not increase the deficit but will significantly reduce it.

A reduction of $1.6 trillion in mandatory spending and $2.4 trillion in discretionary spending is expected between 2026 and 2027. Additionally, an increase in tax revenues is anticipated thanks to deregulation, tax cuts, and new trade agreements, which will strengthen economic growth and employment.

We liberals, libertarians, and Austrians should be less critical of the greatest effort in reducing the State, liberalisation, deregulation, spending cuts, and tax reduction since 1990, but above all, some should not buy into the narrative that denies the positive effect on revenues and growth from deregulation, tax cuts, and trade negotiations.

5. Comparison with Milei: Similarities and Differences

Milei was able to implement immediate cuts because he inherited an open budget and extremely high inflation, which allowed him to reduce public spending in real terms by not adjusting it for inflation. Argentina’s budget does not include the provisions that the Biden administration incorporated, so President Milei was able to carry out a 30% reduction in public spending immediately and with unquestionable success, especially by eliminating subsidies, public works, and non-automatic transfers.

In contrast, Trump inherited a budget that was already committed and much lower inflation (less than 2.5%), limiting the impact of not adjusting spending for inflation.

If we compare both administrations, a very similar effort has been made. Trump has reduced public spending by 5% in the first quarter, and savings exceed $540 billion. By the end of his term, President Trump will have carried out a reduction in public spending equivalent to Milei’s.

Both leaders have promoted policies of tax reduction, deregulation, and the promotion of investment and employment. However, Trump’s tools and room for manoeuvre have been conditioned by the U.S. institutional structure and the decisions of the previous administration.

6. Conclusion

The policies of Trump and Milei share the goal of reducing public spending, fostering growth, and improving employment, but the starting circumstances are radically different. Criticising Trump for not applying an immediate “chainsaw” ignores the budgetary and legal constraints he faces in the United States. What matters is recognising that, within his constraints, Trump is implementing historic cuts and pro-growth policies that will positively impact the U.S. economy in the medium term.

My messages to those who attack the Trump administration for not being liberal enough are as follows:

• Name a single U.S. administration that has successfully implemented a comparable approach to deregulation, tax cuts, and spending reduction while also passing a significant reduction in mandatory spending through both Congress and the Senate.
• Buying into the Keynesian estimates of fiscal impact is curious. Denying the positive impact of reducing imports, increasing exports, and collecting more from trade agreements is surprising. Denying the economic and fiscal boost from deregulation and tax cuts is unforgivable.