This is a warning to America. Open border policies always create a disaster.
The new migration crisis in Ceuta, Spain, is not an isolated episode or a simple border emergency. It is the result of a deeply irresponsible and damaging political and economic model. Sánchez boasts about aggregate growth while destroying cohesion, productivity, net real income per capita, and institutions. Spain is not an example of growth, migrant integration, or cohesion. It is a statistical mirage juiced by population increase and a fiscal time bomb. It has taken a migration crisis for the European Union to wake up.
Illegal immigration is not a stroke of fate or a recipe for growth and for shoring up public finances; it is a strategy of control and demolition of the nation from within, with the aim of creating a dependent, captive underclass, buying votes by altering demographics and shifting onto future generations the enormous cost to the state of a population increase whose net contribution to public accounts is overwhelmingly negative.
Spain was presented by progressives as a model of migrant integration. It was never true, and now it has become a full‑blown crisis. The uncontrolled wave of illegal immigration is the direct result of the socialist government’s policies: mass regularizations, subsidies, and the constant message that illegal migration pays.
For years, Spain has attracted uncontrolled inflows with promises of regularization and public transfers, while Brussels looked the other way because headline GDP grew and the statistics looked “inclusive.” However, the cost is enormous and borne by Spanish workers and taxpayers and, increasingly, by the entire European Union. Its elite tolerated Spain’s destructive policies as long as aggregate GDP was fattened, even in the face of the clear warning sign that GDP per capita was stagnating and pressure on public services and social unrest were rising.
The Sánchez government and its coalition have imposed unprecedented regularization processes, presenting them as a model for Europe and explicitly linking them to GDP increases and the supposed sustainability of the welfare state. This was a major deception. Regularized illegal immigration does not make pensions more sustainable; quite the opposite, because its net contribution to public accounts is unquestionably negative, as all studies on the matter show. Meanwhile, the government inflates aggregate GDP, but GDP per capita, net real wages, productivity, and the real effective employment rate remain stagnant.
The Spanish government has presented itself to the world with an openly pro‑immigration stance, at odds with decisions taken by the European Union itself. However, the Commission and the EU remained silent in the face of the assault on institutions, corruption, and the disaster of migration policy. European institutions bear responsibility because they supported and amplified Sánchez’s destructive, extensive migration policy, presenting it as if it were inclusive. They ignored the evidence that Spain’s numbers are poor once you look beyond headline GDP.
Stagnant GDP per capita: the IMF’s own estimates show that Spain’s GDP per capita will grow by just 1% a year between 2018 and 2027, exactly the same as the euro area average.
Falling net real wages: under Sánchez they have fallen by almost 3%.
Real unemployment: 3.7 million real unemployed, including inactive workers registered with the SEPE and 792,341 inactive permanent‑intermittent workers. The number of effectively unemployed has barely improved since 2019.
Zero fiscal consolidation: the net debt of the public administrations under the Excessive Deficit Procedure has risen to a record 1.6 trillion, while the total liabilities of the public sector have increased by more than half a trillion to 2.2 trillion. Debt‑to‑GDP and the deficit only appear to improve because the denominator is being doped with immigration and inflation above the euro area average.
An unsustainable Social Security system: Sánchez has multiplied Social Security’s debt, and the system needs a bailout every year from a state that is already in deficit. Immigration is not going to reduce that enormous hole; it increases it, as its net contribution is mostly negative.
All the data on the Spanish economy show weakness, statistical illusions, and severe imbalances, but the European Union and the Commission preferred to remain silent, buy the official propaganda, and cling to a doped aggregate GDP. The same thing they did with Greece between 2004 and 2007.
The official narrative highlights headline GDP contributions and demographic arguments while remaining silent about the stagnation of GDP per capita, productivity, net real wages, and the fiscal and institutional strain of absorbing huge irregular inflows through emergency regularizations instead of orderly, skills‑based migration. The EU allowed it because Sánchez sold it as a model when the time bomb was already obvious.
The Spanish government’s strategy is clear: to create a gigantic underclass dependent on public subsidies and captive as a future electorate. The massive inflow of illegal immigrants is the consequence of years of mass regularization policies, subsidy announcements, basic income plans, and a sustained pull factor.
Ceuta is facing its worst migration crisis in years, with thousands of irregular entries in barely a week and reception facilities completely overwhelmed. Centers for adults and minors are overflowing, local authorities speak openly of a humanitarian and social emergency, and the daily pressure on the border shows just how far the state has lost its capacity for anticipation and deterrence. This is not just a migration crisis. It is also a crisis of authority, planning, and institutional credibility.
To understand what Sánchez calls “the rocket,” today in Ceuta “GDP goes up,” but people in Ceuta are poorer and worse off. More migration pressure, overwhelmed public services, greater dependence on public money, more debt, and higher future taxes, while Sánchez boasts about the figures and abandons the border.
The government uses the 0.7% quarterly and 2.7% year‑on‑year GDP growth in the second quarter of 2026 as if it were proof of strength, but aggregate growth is not prosperity. Spain is not growing; it is swelling and getting deeper into debt. The government relies on demographic expansion, artificially propped‑up domestic demand, rising public spending, and jobs in low‑productivity sectors.
Spain is growing in volume and getting poorer in quality. Aggregate GDP increases, but the net real income of its citizens deteriorates. The economy is doped with population and spending while efficiency, competitiveness, and per-capita well-being worsen.
On top of this comes inflation. The flash estimate for July, at 3.5%, once again puts Spain above the euro area average, which had eased to around 2.8%. This gap is not irrelevant. It means loss of competitiveness, more pressure on costs, further erosion of purchasing power, and greater difficulty in turning growth into real prosperity. Spain not only grows with low productivity but also with relatively high inflation. It is the worst combination for selling a supposed durable economic success.
The Spanish economy shows no structural leap in productivity, no decisive improvement in productive investment, and no solid convergence in GDP per capita with the most advanced economies of the euro area, where it remains 8 points below the average of a European Union that itself is not doing well, according to Eurostat.
The Ceuta crisis is a symbol of the complete failure of this model. A massive, irregular inflow of people generates, in the short term, a higher volume of measured activity because it triggers emergency spending, more budget mobilization, and more administrative needs. Statistically, that “pushes up GDP.” However, socially and economically the balance is devastating: it makes citizens poorer, worsens security, increases pressure on housing, healthcare, and education, and the cost is borne by taxpayers who already shoulder high debt, rising taxes, and a loss of net real purchasing power.
This is what “sanchismo” calls success: the numbers grow, and reality deteriorates.
Spain is not suffering border chaos by accident. It is the consequence of Sánchez’s mass regularizations and years of pull‑factor policies, a message to the world that entering illegally pays off.
It is not a mistake; it is a power strategy. Sánchez seeks to create a captive underclass, dependent on subsidies and papers, that will vote for him in the future and shift the social consequences and the bill onto taxpayers. While the government sinks under corruption scandals and loses social support, it tries to cling to power by dismantling Spain and its institutions and importing the future voters it is losing today.
Sánchez is not governing Spain; he is dismantling it in an attempt to cling to power. That is the big lie of Sánchez’s “rocket,” bloating up instead of truly growing.