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What If Germany Turns Off The EU Funding Tap?

(This article was published in Cotizalia on May 26th, 2012)Another week and as part of our leaders think that the rest of the world is wrong, capital continues to fly away from Europe. €700m a day according to press. The credit and financial credibility of the Eurozone couldn’t be any lower. Yes, my friends, investors will not return if the numbers are not solid, and politicians cannot prohibit selling.

Eighteen European summits in two years. European politicians seem increasingly more detached from the real problems of the economy. How can they meet again without reaching an agreement on anything? They seem to give a message of selfishness to the public, and that they are cheating to investors.

We get constant calls to promote growth, which would be fine if they were not calls to encourage the same subsidized wasteful spending of the past. Funily enough, if the EU had cut part of its €141bn budget, out of which 45% goes to “employment and growth”, by today the continent would have a lot less debt and a lot more growth. In any case, I think that we will gradually see a more logical reform agenda for Europe.

We are outraged to see that Germany finances itself at near zero rates while Southern Europe countries finance themselves at 6% or higher. But instead of thinking that, perhaps, the Central European austerity plans work, the press and politicians say that Germany is going against us, “drowning” us.

We hear that the blame for the debt crisis should be pinned on Germany which broke the deficit limits in the early 2000s, which “obviously” led everyone else to go into a debt frenzy. Here nobody is to blame for anything. It’s like those people that stuff themselves with Big Macs and blame McDonald’s for their obesity. If a bank fails, blame it on the “ill will of the anglosaxon press.” If the stock market falls, blame it on Greece or hedge funds, or both. And the giant real estate bubble, the massive subsidy culture and the savings banks’ recklessness have Helmut Kohl to blame. Please

However, countries that have implemented austerity and budget control, from Estonia to Germany, are those who are better off today. We should not demonize them, but learn together how to attract capital and get out of this debt mess. Austerity -cutting giant political spending- and growth -not subsidies.

Austerity and growth are not mutually exclusive. Reckless spend and growth are.


From a market perspective, the only way to reduce risk premiums and attract investor interest is just moving towards a single tax system, and to contain government expenditure, which has done nothing but grow even in years of “austerity”. Public spending in the EU has not fallen in most countries between 2008 and 2011. In Spain it is still 4% higher than in 2008.

The graph below is devastating. Either we adapt spending to “pre-bubble” levels or the CDS will not stop rising.

Why we should not allow the ECB to become the worst hedge fund in the world

When we say that countries should receive more money from the European Central Bank we forget that it can not infect its balance sheet at the rate of one trillion euros per semester.

Germany, the Netherlands and the countries of central Europe are those who have to carry the financing risk. Not France, which has a serious debt problem. And if they close the tap, it will be bad. But if they open the tap too soon and too much it will be worse. Because they run out of water for the next fire.

There are several things we should know about the European Central Bank:

  1. . The ECB’s current debt is monstrous. At 23 or 24 times its assets, with only 82 billion euros in capital and reserves. Of course, the Fed’s balance sheet is also unacceptably high, 53 times its assets … The big difference is that the capitalization of the Fed does not depend on severely indebted entities such as the European states. But as I always say, we should not copy the ones who do wrong and reclaim our right to do worse. Let’s remember that the U.S. is on the brink of a “fiscal cliff.”
  2. . The ECB weakens with the losses incurred from its purchases of sovereign debt. We are talking about latent losses between 55 and 70 billion euros (source Barcap and Open Europe). Of course, many will say that there are no “losses” because the ECB has not sold the bonds -a “bull market” argument- but anyway we want to see it, systemic risk is increasing and does not dissipate by buying more bonds, as we have seen since November. In fact, losses have increased in 2012.
  3. . The European Central Bank has already contributed to the stabilization of the European market, excessively aggressive and quickly. With more than 1 trillion. And the ECB should keep powder dry in case of future emergencies, because the future ain’t what it used to be, to quote Jim Steinman.
  4. . Saying that “we must use the money of the ECB” is false because it is not disposable money. It is debt, which must be funded through more sovereign debt. The ECB Balance sheet growth goes also against our future tax bills.
  5. . To those parties that demand that Europe should “capitalize “the debt of the ECB: Where will that money come from? Furthermore, it an indirect default that would severely impact the creditworthiness of all solid countries of the Eurozone.
The plan
Once we understand that going back to 2007 can not be the goal, that the bubble and the party is over, we will see things are much clearer and less negative.Eurobonds cannot be implemented when one party in a small country can bring half of Europe to its knees. Creditworthiness would collapse when there is no unity in economic and fiscal policy, and the risks spread, as we mentioned here. Eurobonds, no thanks. I hope we have learned something from the subprime crisis. Packing and hiding toxic assets does not reduce the risk, it increases.No, Germany is not closing the tap, in my opinion. Neither they are going to let anyone drown. Let’s not be dramatic. What Europe has to do here is to stop the party of political spending and subsidies. That’s not drowning. Germany has an exposure to the EU of 500 billion euros and the risk of financial contagion between European countries far exceeds the estimates of many banks.

However, I keep hearing that we need a growth plan, which sounds great if it was not for the fact that it’s a borrowing plan. As of today, and after two years writing about it, I can not believe that Europe is betting on more debt. Remember  that almost no European country has created GDP growth ex-debt in the last 22 years. Have we not learned from all those ridiculous infrastructure plans?. I leave you a figure: the European economy generated less than $1 of GDP for every $ 2.5 of debt (Barcap and IMF data). That is, we continue to build the huge ball of debt in the vague hope that growth will multiply exponentially some day.

This week I have seen some possible proposals that would go to the June summit. The recapitalization plan in Europe would happen of three phases:

1) A fund to pay debt (Redemption Fund) that incorporates the indebtedness of over 60% of GDP backed by gold reserves of the States. This fund would repay that debt against a commitment to economic reforms, adjustments and more severe cuts guaranteed in the Constitutions of the member states. The problem? The gold to debt ratio of troubled countries is very low. An average of 6.1% for the Eurozone and 3.5% for Spain or 5.8% for Italy.

Gold Res

2) A line of credit to banks to ensure liquidity needs, but not capital needs. We seem to forget that these are mostly all listed companies that can and should access their investor bases to recapitalize themselves.

Additionally, the idea is to try not to create false inflation . The economic miracle of  Central Europe is based, among other things, on multiplying by three the number of low-paying contracts (mini-jobs). An increase in inflation would be lethal because the euro-zone countries have never been able to control it when it overshoots, especially when it’s external inflation (commodities).

And finally, tackle the unjustified strength of the Euro currency versus the US dollar, to devalue and promote competitiveness, reducing the need for internal devaluation we have seen so far. It will take the market to do this last bit, as economic expectations of the euro-zone are adjusted to more realistic figures.The key is shows in the above graph. Either we attract private capital back once we have proven real creditworthiness, or we continue whinging blaming the Germans, the markets or Hedge Funds.

Germany and the ECB are not the problem, but they are not the solution. Only countries can save themselves. If not, there will come a time when Germany and the ECB runs out of money for bailouts.

Hopefully in June, EU leaders will forget about trying to re-create 2007 and think of a more rational future.To watch my interview on Al Jazeera about the Bankia and Spain (Realplayer Quicktime or Oplayer needed): http://dl.dropbox.com/u/62659029/iv_daniel_lacalle_250512_0.mpg

Further reading:

Eurobonds? No Thanks. Debt Isn’t Solved With More Debt: http://energyandmoney.blogspot.co.uk/2011/11/eurobonds-no-thanks-debt-isnt-solved.html#

What happened to put Spain on the verge of intervention?: http://energyandmoney.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/what-happened-to-put-spain-on-verge-of.html

Why Italian and Spanish CDS can rise 40%… and Greece is not to blame:

The Myth of European Austerity In Five Graphs

This article was written by Manuel Llamas and Domingo Soriano published by Libre Mercado here. All copyright Libertad Digital and Libre Mercado. (Wednesday 23rd June 2012).

“A lie repeated a thousand times becomes the truth”. This well-known sentence, attributed to the master of Nazi propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, could also serve to illustrate the great deception of the alleged public austerity in Europe. Since the outbreak of the debt crisis, it is widely repeated that Germany has sought to impose on the rest of the EU partners an adjustment plan focused on cutting costs and implementing structural reforms that would foster economic growth.

This strategy has been harshly criticized by many economists and by the Southern European countries, the weakest in this crisis, with Greece leading the critics. In fact, analysts, politicians and union leaders blame all the current problems of Europe, including the Greek default, on the imposed austerity measures. After the recent French and Greek elections, the critics of Merkel’s strategy have begun to gain notoriety, to the extent that the European summit to be held on Wednesday will focus more on how to boost growth through government spending (stimulus) than on further cuts in policy to reduce the deficit and debt burden.

However, official data (Eurostat) shows that the much-touted European austerity is today little more than a myth. The Greek default was not due to the demanded cuts but due to the decision to keep a bloated state unchanged. Likewise, the evolution of spending, deficits and public debt in the euro area shows that the austerity only exists on paper. Neither governments have stopped spending well above their means, nor have they undertaken structural reforms to enable their economies to improve their productivity and grow solidly in the near future.

More public spending

The most striking figure, amid all the rhetoric against the cuts, is that public spending in the euro area as a whole has grown by almost 7% between 2008 and 2011, reaching 4.65 billion euro.

In the South of Europe, those most affected by austerity in theory, the evolution is similar: Public spending in France rose by 8.6% since 2008, in Spain, 4%, in Italy, 3%, in Portugal, 7.8%, while in Greece, despite all the announced cuts, spending fell just 8.5% over the 2008 level, although today its public sector continues to spend 2% more than in 2007 (just before the crisis).

In essence, no European country has managed to reduce their public spending to 2004 levels, a few years before the start of the international crisis, which itself could be considered as an exercise in austerity. Not at all. The following chart summarizes the evolution of public spending in these countries, measured in nominal terms at current prices.

auste01

auste02In fact, the situation hardly changed if we look at the evolution of public spending in real terms after inflation.

More deficit and debt

Of course, increasing public spending also meant higher deficit and public debt. As such, in the middle of alleged austerity, the deficit in the euro area as a whole, far from diminishing, has tripled since 2008 , from 2.1% of GDP to 6.2% in 2011, while public debt has grown from 70.1% in 2008 to 87.2% of GDP last year.

As we can see in the graph below, the public sectors in Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal, the four southern European countries most affected by the debt crisis, are still spending more than they earn. Only a few countries in the North and East of the continent (exemplified here by Germany and Estonia) have maintained their public at deficit under control during these years of crisis.

Chart above shows public deficit.

Obviously, if the deficit is out of control every year, public debt will continue a worrying upward trend. As we can see in the image below, all the countries of southern Europe have public debt figures that are much higher than that held at the beginning of the crisis. Even Spain, which began with a very reasonable level of public debt of less than 30% of GDP, is now touching 70% and could end 2012 above 80%.

deuda-publica-22052012

Greece, meanwhile, is at levels close to 200% and Italy is moving steadily to 130%. With these levels of debt, it is logical to see international investors unwilling to buy more South European government bonds, and the to see the CDS and spreads versus the Bund soar. But governments and political parties continue to blame the “evil speculators” or the unfairness of German taxpayers, strangely reluctant to lend more money when nobody else wants to either.
Chart above shows public debt growth.
Along with the complaints about unreasonable “cuts” allegedly “imposed by the markets” (or the Germans), in recent weeks we have seen a growing public debate that wrongly puts austerity and growth as two opposite concepts. They are not. Austerity is the antonym of waste. In fact, recent history shows that more government spending does not foster growth, and does not help to get out of economic difficulties.

The current crisis began in 2007. From then until late 2011, the four southern European countries we are considering implemented aggressive public “investment” policies that Keynesian economists would qualify as clearly expansionary, with deficits close to or above 10% for several years. If this theory were true, Greece, Portugal and Spain would have already recovered and the growth generated by the “virtuous circle” created by government spending would be paying their debts. But none of this happened.

deficit-publico-22052012

crecimiento-pib-22052012

Meanwhile, Germany and Estonia followed the opposite path and imposed austerity. The result is that both countries had a strong relapse in 2009, with the political cost that it entails . But they are recovering faster and now have much stronger economies. Meanwhile, in Spain, the “Plan E” of investment in infrastructures, an enormous waste of public funds with its vast implication on cost of borrow and deficit, and other public spending measures have failed to stem the crisis. But the message currently repeated over and over is that it takes even more government spending, for much longer, to foster growth. But… For how long?

Chart above shows growth in GDP


Follow Manuel Llamas on @manuel_llamas

Spain: Exit The Euro? A Long and Painful Death

(This article was published in Cotizalia on May 19th 2012)
This week everyone is talking about the possible Greek exit from the euro and the apparently appealing idea of “why not Spain?”. Let’s press the Reset button and start over. We have discussed Greece in detail here (http://energyandmoney.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/greek-drama.html).

The Greek state, which has more public employees than Spain with four times fewer inhabitants, wasted bailout after bailout and continues delaying reforms, saying that “they’ll come, be patient”. And now, some demand breaking the agreement-yes-after having accepted the money. One thing is to belong to the European club with its obligations and rights, and another is to demand to participate only for the party and not to collect the broken glasses … But it is their sovereign decision to shoot themselves in the foot.To read the arguments in favor of breaking the euro, I recommend the interesting and detailed analysis of Jonathan Tepper here. But I’ll give my opinion focusing on Spain. Leave the euro? No. And I think Spain should not, due to the dangerous implications for the country, its partners and the financial system . Why?

. Because Spain is not rich in oil, gas or natural resources as most countries that have made default and devaluation in the past decades, which allowed them to contain hyperinflation.

. Because even if Spain leaves the euro and enters into a default, it will not be freed to carry out the reforms, adjustments and severe cuts needed due to its structural primary deficit.

. Because Spain can ease its debt problem with reforms and budget control, continuing as a major country in the OECD without breaking the rules.

Leaving the euro, and re-structuring -default, bankruptcy, it’s all the same- to start again is like cheating at cards to try to continue in the casino without paying the debts, and as such you get thrown out. It would lead to a collapse of of 25-40% of GDP quite likely, according to UBS, with 45% unemployment, and hyperinflation.. and then, hopefully, grow.

The examples of devaluation and default in Spain are not encouraging.

Spain devalued the peseta seven times between 1959 and 1993. Inflation and unemployment overshot but what is most important is that by the end of the devaluation frenzy the economy was not stronger, unemployment remained stubbornly high and real inflation -not official- rose well above the expected targets. In the early 90s the so-called “devalue for growth” measures delivered no strong growth and just the obliteration of the middle class for years until the country recovered in 96, mostly due to a massive real estate bubble. Spain devalued in 1992 twice its currency by 6% and 5% and in 1993 by 8%. Unemployment reached 24% (3.5 million), public debt to GDP shot to 68% and public deficit soared to 7% of GDP.

To grow after the shock departure of the euro would require capital. Who would lend or invest in Spain after a blow of such caliber? Just look at the list of countries that have abandoned the reference currencies. Either rich in natural resources or examples of extreme poverty.

In the best case there would be a V effect on growth of GDP. A very doubtful effect that, if anything, would lead to the same starting point. Of the twelve countries that have made ​​mega-devaluations in the last 20 years, none generated a GDP growth remotely similar to the devaluation imposed. Average devaluation of 40% for an average increase in GDP over three years of 10%. Immediate poverty without increasing wealth. As U2 would say, ‘running to stand still’.

An exit of the euro would lead to a devaluation of 35% minimum, default on debt, and the contraction of GDP would be enormous, up to 20% but Spain would continue with a primary deficit problem, which is 3% to 4% currently. The primary deficit is the difference between revenue and expenditure without incorporating the financial burden of public debt.

Spain, as in the bad years pre-euro would have to finance this primary deficit… where? At what cost? In fact, in all cases in the past, the runaway deficit has been the first consequence of the departure of the reference currency . Thus, Spain would have make severe cuts in addition to the drop in investment and disposable income . Leaving the Euro does not free Spain from the much needed cuts and reforms.

At what cost would the Spanish State finance itself outside the euro? The 10 year bond at 6%, which today seems too high, would go to much higher levels. Spain’s financing rate soared to 13% in the devaluation frenzy of the 90s. And CDS in Argentina is 1,196 compared to Spain at 500. And what would happen to corporations? Half of the private debt of the country is held by 28 companies of the Ibex 35 Index. These would bankrupt with the subsequent massive impact on employment.

To think that a Spanish exit of the euro would have no contagion effect in Europe and Latin America, its financial and trading partners, with the subsequent effect on export capacity is also dangerous. Spain would create a domino effect of risk on some European banks, our lenders- as well as defaults on domestic ones, with the consequent spread to Latin America. But once done, Spain would become like Argentina or Ecuador … but without oil and gas, natural resources to keep inflation under control.

Do not forget that Spain is already a net importer of commodities, including agricultural ones. Hyperinflation in such products would lead to extreme poverty, and oe can not be re-orient a nation to autarchy and agriculture in a year.

I remember seeing staff at supermarkets in Argentina changing price tags every half an hour while the government repeated over and over that inflation was just 9%.

Those countries that abandoned reference currencies, made huge devaluations and defaults, kept prices of its domestic oil and gas artificially low to contain hyperinflation. And despite this, inflation shot up to levels of 9% -11%. And in Spain, the “high inflation vs hyperinflation” debate is irrelevant. With 24% unemployment already, 9-10% inflation is hyperinflation.

In Spain, hyperinflation would consume the economy again, as a net importer of raw materials. And the example of other devaluations shows that unemployment is not reduced substantially. Although Argentina doubled its number of civil servants after the de-dollarization, unemployment rose from 14% to to 22% three years later only to fall to an 8% “official” -11% real- rate today, more than 10 years later.

On the other hand, ‘default’ would have a financial domino effect . Given the huge exposure of the banking world to Spain and its private companies, it would create a credit ‘crunch’ at least in Europe if not global. If it happens now with the Greek risk, where we do not know if the impact is 400 billion or a trillion euro, imagine with Spain, which is three times larger than Greece.

But in addition, assuming that the international financial system recovers from the effect of “Spain is out of the euro”, which would take away a good part of the assets of our investors, the country would have very severe financing issues, as it happened in the previous seven devaluations. Because Spain has no natural resources, gold or technology sufficient to make us able to force an autarchy that doesn’t mean “poor for 100 years” . A country back to poor shepherds, farmers and tourism services as in 1960.

Spain is Spain, not Iceland

It seems obvious. The bankruptcy of Iceland, a widely used example, was a national agreement of mutual impoverishment in a country of 320,000 inhabitants. Fewer inhabitants than Bilbao. Spain has 47 million. The implications are devastating. Iceland, when broke, was not as relevant for the global economy as Spain is. In 2007, Iceland had a GDP of 8.5 billion compared with a trillion from Spain. The debt of Iceland, at 800% of the GDP was nothing, tiny, in the global financial world. Nevertheless, its default generated a ‘credit crunch’ that affected many countries. The impact of the debt of Spain, which is 3.5 times the GDP of the country is a major risk of an international financial meltdown.

The cost of leaving the Euro of Greece is estimated between 400 billion euros and 1 trillion euros. Spain would be around 2 to 3.5 trillion euros. With that cost, and an impact on financial markets and banks that could last years of provisions and losses, Spain would not see much of a dime of external financing, which would curtail its return-to-growth options.

A problem created in a decade is not solved in one day.

Spain and Europe suffer the hangover from over a decade of debt. And you don’t not cure a hangover from years of alcoholism in two months. Trying quick solutions has a monstrous side effect.

Spain has to lower its debt within the euro, slimming its wasteful spending (14 billion in subsidies, 100bn in duplicated political spending) to improve its creditworthiness and, therefore, make debt less expensive, while reducing total debt. Attract investors and make State with lower and more sustainable costs. Additionally, it must reorient its production model to high-productivity sectors, making an attractive environment for investors, for the entrepreneur. Not all civil works, infrastructure, useless subsidies and housing.

Devaluations and defaults destroy long-term capital investment because it becomes well known that the country will make more and more devaluations, as we did in the past, and defaults.

Spain needs a process of deleveraging in the private and public sector, which, on the other hand, the country can afford without breaking the rules. Another thing is that until today they have not wanted to do because it was easier to wait until more funds from the EU arrive.

In short, the deleveraging is healthy . Growth will not spectacular, but cleaning unproductive sectors unclogs the fundamental problem, that the country borrows to pay current expenses and interest charges. Spain, if it reduces useless expense and the culture of subsides, can reduce debt with modest growth of a mature economy, but with an affordable and sustainable cost and size, appropriate to the cyclical nature of its production model. Not running to stand still.

To watch my interview on Al Jazeera about the Bankia and Spain (Realplayer Quicktime or Oplayer needed): http://dl.dropbox.com/u/62659029/iv_daniel_lacalle_250512_0.mpg

Further read from Juan Rallo: http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/bringing-back-the-peseta-won%E2%80%99t-solve-spain%E2%80%99s-problems

The Greek Drama

(This article was published in Cotizalia on February 2012 and updated on June 17 for the elections)The exit of Greece from the euro and another default seems almost a certainty. An exit and yet another default.

Putting hundreds of billions into a state that consumes every bailout without tackling the issues of corruption and excess spend, when everyone discounts the inevitable, is a futile exercise and a collective suicide of the European Union. And bailouts have no positive effect on peripheral risk, which is still at levels that were considered “unacceptable” two years ago, despite unlimited liquidity injections.

The Greek state, which has more public workers than Spain with four times fewer inhabitants, has wasted bailout after bailout and continues to delay reforms, and now threatens to melt into a political debacle, with some parties asking to re-negotiate the treaty… After receiving the money.

I recommend you read the chapter on Greece from “Boomerang “by Michael Lewis to understand why the money that has been lent will not be recovered easily. But first and foremost, keeping this painful endless drama has no positive effect for Greece. It only helps, delays the pain actually, to the lending banks, especially German and French, which accumulate €138 billion of Greek debt.

No wonder that France and Germany, who keep €57 and €34 billion of Greek debt respectively, are those who insist on keeping the terminally ill in the euro at all costs, although the country’s GDP collapses at an annual rate of 4-6%, and debt to GDP is at 130%.

Rescuing Greece does not solve anything in a country that overspends 8% of its entire GDP every year, while revenues collapse and new expenditures appear every quarter. A bottomless pit in a system, the euro, within which it can not and will not recover.

And the difference between Greece and other European countries, like Portugal, is that its political parties are not accepting to make the needed reforms. The whole system is becoming almost a swindle of promised reforms in exchange for a bailout that never reaches the population (80% of the bailout money returns to the banks to pay interests) but the people do suffer the budget cuts, which happen everywhere except where they are needed (in the bloated political and public system).Rescuing Greece does not work, we have seen it many times. But would it really be a debacle if Europe allows Greece to restructure and exit the euro, staying in the euro zone as a member similar to Poland, with its own currency?. I always say that if Greece formally bankrupts it clarifies and limits the risk, and we can narrow down and isolate the problem.

Europe can not afford to pay the equivalent to 10% of Spain’s GDP every five months to Greece -to the banks, I must say- to get nowhere.

Given a scenario in which Italy has refinanced only 15% of their maturities for 2012 and Spain only 28%, many of the European Union officials fear that leaving Greece on its own would have a huge impact on the credit default swaps of countries.

The problem in Greece is not the problem of Portugal or Spain or Italy. Those are countries who have dealt in the past with significant challenges and dealt with them. Greece has not balanced a budget for decades.

The cost of rescuing Greece would be another 130 billion euros to start, plus more than 200 billion euros that Europe can consider gone. But Greece’s economy needs to deal with a much larger issue. The political debacle and corruption. So bailouts will not help. That is the Greek drama. And the same politicians, even under different party names, will not solve it. Because the bailout system keeps them alive at the expense of the people.Update for the elections

The Greek elections have scared so many countries that we hear cries to “study” the “possibility” of a concerted action by central banks if Greece leaves the euro. Such is the likely contagion impact.

The Greek election analysis has been done in the markets from a Manichean perspective. New Democracy are the good guys and the bad guys are Syriza. I am more interested in the economic impact of any outcome, and as such, I fear that Greek elections, no matter what happens, will deliver a result that will be bad in any way for European debt.

I say this because, either due to another bailout -and Greece has received the equivalent of 115 Marshall plans in the past years -or by default, Greece shows us the fragility of Europe’s debt web and the risk of covering “debt with more debt.” Greece is not the problem, it is part of it, but it can make a big impact on the global economy due to the exposure to its debt from other countries.

For starters, Greece will need a new additional injection of 15 billion within weeks. Remember in April 2010 when former Spanish president said that the country would gain about 110 million euros a year -yes, a year-with the loan to Greece? Now, neither loan nor gain. Donation.

To put it simply:

. If New Democracy wins , the conservatives or a pro-troika coalition, Greece will probably renegotiate the terms of the bailout, yet require a package of “growth support”-translation: debt- in infrastructure projects financed by the EIB. Financed might be a big word, as these will likely not be repaid. The “cost” of this option is estimated at 50 billion to 60 billion euros in 18 months.

. If Syriza -the left- wins or an anti-bailout coalition reaches government, they will threaten with leaving the euro, and option that could cost Europe between 300 to 400 billion euros, according to an analysis of the Eurogroup, or one trillion, according to Lukas Papadimos. And if they stay, they will force a revision of the austerity programs, an estimated cost of 150 billion if we assume the costs of stopping the adjustments and another partial restructuring of its debt.

. Of course, if Greece goes to a third round of elections, which cost the not inconsiderable amount of 35 million euros each, we should be ready for another hot summer.The reality is that no matter who wins, in Greece the scheme of a hypertrophied political state, spending and cronyism between government and party is the only one who does not suffer. And that any cost of the Greek outcome will be funded by additional debt from a Eurozone with fewer resources which finds itself increasingly isolated from international markets.

(This last update was published in Cotizalia on June 15th 2012)

From UBS:

If they were to leave the Euro, it is likely that a new drachma could lose half of its value when introduced. That’s consistent with other episodes of countries abandoning fixed exchange rate regimes – for example during the Asian crisis of 1997/98. A 50% depreciation of the currency means that Greek GDP in euro would be halved too. As a consequence, the debt to GDP ratio would double. This means that, in order to reduce the ratio by one third, our original target to make the trajectory “sustainable”, the haircut needed is now two-thirds. This simply doubles the loss for foreign investors. In the case of a ½ haircut, it would have to become a 3/4 haircut. In this scenario, the estimated cost for the European taxpayer of a one-third haircut is no longer €60.6Bn, but potentially €121.3Bn. The cost for the European taxpayer in case of a 50% haircut is no longer €91.0Bn, but €136.4Bn.Additionally, Target 2 imbalances would have to be added to the bill, this is currently worth 104Bn. We estimate that the total cost for European taxpayers in case of an exit of Greece would be almost four times more, at €225Bn.

From RBS:

eKathimerini reports that a new opinion poll suggests that the Greek elections will see SYRIZA in a face-off against New Democracy. According to the survey, SYRIZA would garner 28% in elections next month, while ND, which co-signed Greece’s debt deal with socialist PASOK but has long pushed for a renegotiation of the terms of the agreement, would get 24%. PASOK would come in third with 15%, according to the poll, which was carried out last week. Other opinion polls put ND ahead of SYRIZA, which are expected to clash in this election campaign.

Worth looking at HSBC’s solid report published on May 23rd on the implications of a Greek exit:

Devaluations can be really damaging for a short term that is already very difficult for the population:

The Greek exit is manageable, but contagion might not:
And the four possible outcomes of the Greek crisis

Greece could run out of cash this month, despite its widely heralded second bailout.   http://www.cnbc.com/id/47700847

Interesting to see Credit Suisse Macro conference polling results:

Do you think Greece will exit the Euro by year-end 2012?
1.Yes 29%
2.No 71%

Sources: UBS, RBS, Zerohedge, HSBC